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ABSTRACT 
 
Shall We Kill or Enslave Caesar? Analyzing the Caesar Model
*
 
When a society overthrows a ruler – call the ruler Caesar – what determines whether Caesar 
is killed or enslaved? This paper presents a model of killing versus enslaving Caesar, based 
on a new theory which unifies justice, status, and power. The model pertains to societies 
which value ordinal goods like bravery, yielding predictions for three of the five types of 
societies – justice-nonmaterialistic, status, and power-nonmaterialistic. Results cover 
members’ gains, effects of own rank and group size, and relative gains from killing or 
enslaving Caesar. Further results suggest that Caesar will be killed only in a justice-
nonmaterialistic society, and from the noblest of motives – to achieve equal gains for 
members. 
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example, the classic Policraticus by John of Salisbury ([1159] 1909) and the extensive
commentaries in the 849 years since its publication.
1
Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown.
William Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part II
One of the most efficacious remedies that a prince can have against
conspiracies is not to be hated and despised by the people, for he
who conspires against a prince always expects to please them by
his removal; but when the conspirator can only look forward to
offending them, he will not have the courage to take such a course,
for the difficulties that confront a conspirator are infinite.
Nicolò Machiavelli, The Prince
1.  INTRODUCTION
We have grown up with images of kings killed and emperors assassinated.  From the
stabbing of Caesar to the guillotining of Louis XVI to the shooting of Czar Nicholas, we have
asked why.  Why not send them into exile?  Or imprison them?  Or place them under house
arrest?  Why kill them?  There are two important pertinent scholarly traditions , one historical, the
other philosophical.  The historical tradition provides a positive account of the long series of
killings of tyrants.  And the philosophical tradition offers a normative discussion of the
conditions under which tyrannicide is permissible, or even obligatory (and of who should or
should not participate and the means by which it should be carried out).  Yet the behavioral
question remains.  Why kill Caesar?
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Meanwhile, as scientific understanding of human behavior grows, new theories yield new
insights.  One of the grand insights of twentieth century social science – inherited from the
Greeks -- was the centrality of justice processes (Homans 1974; Berger, Zelditch, Anderson, and2
Cohen 1972; Jasso 1980).  The long reach of justice can be discerned in virtually all of human
behavior, from love to crime, from gifts to revolution, from religious institutions to disasters.
In this paper, we use the lens of justice analysis to explore the old question, why kill
Caesar?  We use the axiomatization developed by Jasso in a long series of papers (starting in
1978 and 1980 and recently summarized in 2005, 2006b, and 2007 (and more briefly in 2006a). 
This axiomatization distinguishes between societies which value cardinal things (like wealth and
land) called materialistic societies -- and societies which value ordinal things (like beauty and
intelligence) -- called nonmaterialistic societies.  But the engine is the same for both, namely, the
justice force.
The justice axiomatization begins with the four central questions in the study of justice,
as compiled by Jasso and Wegener (1997):
1.  What do individuals and societies think is just, and why?
2.  How do ideas of justice shape determination of actual situations?
3.  What is the magnitude of the perceived injustice associated with departures
from perfect justice?
4.  What are the behavioral and social consequences of perceived injustice?
The work reported in this paper falls under the fourth central question but uses the
building-blocks developed to address the other questions, notably the justice evaluation function,
which addresses the third question and in theoretical justice analysis operates as first postulate.
There is a large literature on the fourth central question, often referred to as the literature
on reactions to injustice (Hegtvedt 2006).  Examples include Adams (1965), Cohen-Charash and
Spector (2001), and Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, and Huo (1997), as well as Jasso’s theoretical
work on justice and comparison processes, some of which is referenced in this paper.  For more
general overviews of justice analysis, see Hegtvedt (2006) and Jasso (2006a).  Besides the
literature on reactions to injustice, there is another large literature on ideas about what is just
(addressing the first central question).  Hegtvedt (2006:47) and Jasso (2007:339, 343-344) show
how the justice evaluation function serves as a bridge that connects the two literatures.3
For a long time, perhaps all of the twentieth century, it was known that not all persons or
societies fall under the aegis of justice.  Like the tone-deaf or color-blind, some persons seem
justice-oblivious, as do the societies they form.
And, similarly, for a long time it was unclear how justice is related to other basic
processes, such as status and power.  Indeed, some authors used the terms interchangeably, while 
for others one or the other had primacy.  Certainly everyone agreed that all three candidates for
basic forces – status, justice, power – are responsive to the same human characteristics.  Wealth,
for example, increases status, and it pushes toward unjust overreward, and it increases power.  So
do beauty, intelligence, and skills of all kinds (athletic, musical, artistic).  There is a status
hierarchy, and a power hierarchy, and a justice hierarchy (though sometimes “continuum” is used
instead of “hierarchy”).
Status and power, like justice, are also addressed by large literatures.  For brief
introduction to status theory, see Berger and Webster (2006), Jasso (2001b), and Ridgeway
(2006).  Jasso and Kotz (2007) describe how the mathematical foundation for studying status was
laid by  Berger, Cohen, and Zelditch (1966), Berger, Fisek, Norman, and Zelditch (1977), Goode
(1978), and So /rensen (1979).  Jasso (2004) proposes a list of four central questions in the study
of status.  The work reported in this paper addresses the fourth question, which, paralleling the
list in justice analysis, is: “What are the behavioral and social consequences of according and
receiving status and of discrepancies between expected and received status?”
The literatures on power are voluminous.  For example, one literature can be traced to the
classic paper by Emerson (1962) and brief introduction to more than forty years of elaboration
and extension is provided by Cook, Cheshire, and Gerbasi (2006).
The early 21  century has brought a possible solution to the puzzle of the exact relations
st
among the three candidate forces – justice, status, and power.  This possible solution rests on the
suggestion that they each have distinctive rates of change (Jasso 2007,  in press).  Although all
three are increasing functions of the same things (such as wealth or beauty), they each increase at
a distinctive rate.  Jasso’s axiomatization of justice includes a proof that the justice evaluation  Power is widely thought to increase with personal quantitative characteristics – such as
2
wealth – but the research record is sparse with respect to the form of the function (Webster
2006).  Thus, the power force is compatible with a constant rate of change.
4
increases as the logarithm of the ratio of the actual reward to the just reward, thus implying that
justice increases at a decreasing rate with the valued good (Jasso 1990).  The axiomatization of
status based on the Goode-So /rensen formulation proposes that status increases at an increasing
rate with the valued good (Jasso 2001b).  Thus, if power is truly a distinct force – and not merely
another name for status, or for justice – it must increase at a constant rate.   To visualize the
2
distinctive rates of change, Figure 1 depicts the three sociobehavioral forces in a 12-person group
which values an ordinal good.
– Figure 1 about here –
This proposed solution led to a new unified theory with its own new axiomatization and a
new view of the three sociobehavioral forces as not only fundamental but also, and importantly,
in competition with each other for the hearts and minds of persons and the societies they form. 
The justice-oblivious may be votaries of status or acolytes of power.
As well, the new unified theory suggests that each of the three sociobehavioral forces
generates, during the time it is active, identity and happiness.
Accordingly, it follows that correct understanding of the sense of justice is not possible
without understanding its rivals, for to understand justice is to understand its boundaries and
limitations.  In this paper, we thus explore the question, Why kill Caesar? using not only the
justice lens but also the status and power lenses.  As will be seen, this approach enables a strong
conclusion about the part played by justice processes in “killing Caesar.”
As noted, in justice theory, people and societies can be materialistic or nonmaterialistic. 
So, too, in power societies; people can care about wealth or about beauty, the first treated as a
cardinal good and the second as an ordinal good.  Not so in the world of status.  The Goode-
So /rensen formulation asserts that status notices only relative ranks; the status votary may care
about wealth but only in the form of wealth rank, not in the form of wealth amount.  Thus, in the5
new unified theory of sociobehavioral forces, there are five main types of societies:  justice-
materialistic, justice-nonmaterialistic, status, power-materialistic, and power-nonmaterialistic.
The killing-Caesar model we develop notices only ranks.  Thus, we explore three possible
kinds of societies:  justice-nonmaterialistic, status, and power-nonmaterialistic.  It is possible, of
course, to examine killing Caesar in a materialistic regime, but we think it less natural and leave
it to a future exercise.
Further, we must consider an alternative to killing Caesar.  The alternative we choose is
enslaving Caesar.  Empirically, enslaving can take the form of house arrest, imprisonment, or
actual enslavement.  The important feature of enslavement is that Caesar topples from top rank to
bottom rank.
Finally, our results are general and can be applied to many different kinds of real-world
situations.  For example, the focal group can be a set of conspirators or an entire society. 
Similarly, the setting can be a country, an association, a club.  In some contexts, the killing-
Caesar option is equivalent to permanent exile.  We leave to future work a further analysis to
distinguish between killing and exiling Caesar, while noting that in some contexts, such as clubs,
throwing someone out of the club is the operational equivalent of killing Caesar.
2.  THEORETICAL SETUP
2.1.  Elements of the Setup Common to All Three Kinds of Societies
Consider a group with N members.  The members all value the same good – such as
wealth, land, cattle, military prowess, bravery, or horsemanship.  If the good is cardinal (such as
wealth, land, or head of cattle), the members value its ordinal manifestation.  Accordingly, the N
members are ranked, with the rank i going from 1 for the lowest-ranked to N for the highest-
ranked.  The sociobehavioral force generates a score for each person – such as a magnitude of
status or of the justice evaluation – and also generates an identity and a magnitude of happiness
(Jasso 2007, in press).
In the situation we explore, the highest-ranked person – Caesar -- is overthrown. 6
Empirically, this can be the work of all the other members, or of a subset of conspirators, or even
of an outsider.  The group remains intact (except for Caesar’s unseating); no outsider becomes a
member.
The top-ranked person may, but need not, be a ruler; if a ruler, the top-ranked person may
be tyrannical or beneficent.  Obviously, the case of the tyrant is the classic case discussed by
Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, John of Salisbury, Aquinas, and others in their analyses of sedition as
a response to injustice.  “Without justice, what are kingdoms but great robberies,” asks
Augustine (City of God, Book IV, Ch 4).  And Aquinas (Summa Theologica II-II, Q. 42, art. 2),
analyzing the morality of tyrannicide, notes, “It is the tyrant rather that is guilty of sedition.”
Again, the model is applicable to any group or society with a hierarchy based on a valued
ordinal characteristic.  Caesar is the top-ranked person in the group’s hierarchy.
Killing Caesar – what happens to group size and own rank?  It is obvious that in the
killing scenario, group size diminishes by one.  Formally, group size at Time 1 is N; at Time 2 it
is N-1.  Given that the top person is killed, own rank stays the same for all other group members. 
Formally, own rank is i at both Time 1 and Time 2.
Enslaving Caesar – what happens to group size and own rank?  In this scenario it is
obvious that group size stays the same.  Formally, group size is N at both Time 1 and Time 2. 
Own rank, however, increases by one for all group members, given that Caesar is now the
lowest-ranked person.  Formally, own rank is i at Time 1 and increases to i+1 at Time 2.
To analyze the effects on each group member, we use the technique of theoretical
derivation known as the micromodel strategy.  The basic idea is that an event – in this case,
killing or enslaving Caesar – produces a change in each group member’s well-being by altering
the justice, status, or power score.  The change may be positive or negative; that is, individuals
may become better-off or worse-off as a result of the focal event.  This technique has been used  For comprehensive exposition of the micromodel and an extended example, see Jasso
3
(2001a); for two additional extended examples, see Jasso (2004, 2006b).
  The relative ranks have several appealing properties.  First, their arithmetic mean is
4
exactly one-half.  Second, the first and Nth relative ranks are equidistant from 0 and 1,
respectively, and also from the mean.  Third, the elements of each subrange pair (e.g., 2 and N-1)
are equidistant from 0 and 1, respectively, and also from the mean.
7
to analyze effects of gifts, theft, disasters, and so on.
3
2.2.  Caesar Model in a Justice-Nonmaterialistic Society
The justice-nonmaterialistic version of the Caesar model begins with the first postulate of
justice theory, the justice evaluation function, expressed for ordinal goods:
where J denotes the justice evaluation, r denotes the individual’s relative rank, and the subscripts
A and C denote the actual and just elements, respectively.  The relative rank is approximated by
i/(N+1), where, as before, i is the absolute rank and N is the group size, leading to:
4
The change in the justice evaluation from Time 1 to Time 2 is denoted CJ and written:
where the subscripts “1" and “2" denote Time 1 and Time 2, respectively.
Assuming that the just reward remains the same from Time 1 to Time 2, we obtain:
and thence:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)  The unsubscripted relative rank is equivalent to the “actual” relative rank in the justice
5
evaluation.  While status is generated by the actual rank alone, the justice evaluation is generated
by comparison of the actual relative rank to the “just” relative rank.
8
(6)
Applying to formula (5) the rules in Section 2.1 for the changes in own rank i and group
size N in the killing and enslaving scenarios yields the final expressions for CJ in the two
scenarios:
2.3.  Caesar Model in a Status Society
The status version of the Caesar model begins with the first postulate of status theory, the
status function (also known as the S1 function):
where S denotes status and r denotes relative rank.   Replacing r by its approximation i/(N+1)
5
yields:
where, as before, i and N denote own rank and group size, respectively.
The change in status from Time 1 to Time 2 is denoted CS and written:
(5)
(7)
(8)
(9)9
(11)
where, as before, the subscripts “1" and “2" denote Time 1 and Time 2, respectively.  Formula
(9) reduces to:
Applying to formula (10) the rules in Section 2.1 for the changes in own rank i and group
size N in the killing and enslaving scenarios yields the final expressions for CS in the two
scenarios:
2.4.  Caesar Model in a Power Society
The power version of the Caesar model begins with the first postulate of the fledgling
power theory.  Here power increases at a constant rate with the valued good.  For ordinal goods,
power increases at a constant rate with relative rank:
where P denotes power and, as before, r denotes relative rank.  Replacing r by its approximation
i/(N+1) yields:
The change in power from Time 1 to Time 2 is denoted CP and written:
Applying to formula (14) the rules in Section 2.1 for the changes in own rank i and group
size N in the killing and enslaving scenarios yields the final expressions for CP in the two
(10)
(12)
(13)
(14)10
(15)
scenarios:
2.5.  Analyzing CJ, CS, and CP
To assess the effects of killing versus enslaving Caesar, we pose the following questions:
1.  For each group member, is the change in well-being (CJ, CS, or CP) positive or
negative?
2.  What is the ceteris paribus effect of own rank i on CJ, CS, and CP?
3.  What is the ceteris paribus effect of group size N on CJ, CS, and CP?
4.  Under which scenario – killing or enslaving Caesar – are group members better-off?
To answer the first question, we evaluate the sign of formulas (6), (11), and (15) for CJ,
CS, and CP in the two scenarios.  To answer the second and third questions, we obtain the first
partial derivatives of the six formulas in (6), (11), and (15) with respect to own rank and group
size.  Finally, to answer the fourth question, we set up and solve the inequality formed by the
formulas for the two scenarios in each of the three force-regimes.
3.  THEORETICAL RESULTS
3.1.  Do Group Members Become Better-Off
When Caesar Is Killed or Enslaved?
Evaluating the sign of the six change formulas (panel A of Table 1) indicates that all six
are positive.  Lingering over the results for the justice-nonmaterialistic regime, it is easy to see
that CJ is positive because in both the killing and the enslaving cases, CJ is the logarithm of a
ratio and the numerator of the ratio is larger than the denominator.  The same is true in the two
status cases.  The formulas in the two power cases are obviously positive.  Thus, when Caesar is11
killed or enslaved, under all three force-regimes, every group member becomes better-off.
– Table 1 about here –
Expressed formally, we have the first theoretical result:
Result 1 (Universal Gain from Overthrowing Caesar):  In a
justice-nonmaterialistic society, a status society, or a power-
nonmaterialistic society, everyone gains from overthrowing
Caesar, regardless of whether Caesar is killed or enslaved.
3.2.  Does Own Rank Affect the Gain from Killing or Enslaving Caesar?
Inspecting the change formulas in Table 1, it is evident that own rank has no effect on CJ
in the killing case and on CP in the enslaving case, as it does not appear in the formulas.  In the
other four cases we take the first partial derivatives of the change formulas with respect to i and
find that the effect is negative in the justice-enslaving case and positive in both status cases and
the power-killing case.  Thus, holding constant group size, the gains are equal in two cases and
unequal in the other four.  Moreover, in the unequal cases, we find both a case where lower-
ranked members reap greater gains than higher-ranked members and three cases where the
opposite occurs.  These results are collected in panel B of Table 1.
Expressed formally, we have the second theoretical result which we report as a set of
results and which, because it is based on partial derivatives, pertains to the case where group size
is held constant (including, of course, application to a single society):
Result 2 (Equal and Unequal Gains from Overthrowing
Caesar, Holding Group Size Constant):  The gains from
overthrowing Caesar are equal in two of the six cases considered
and unequal in the other four.
Result 2.1 (Equal and Unequal Gains from Overthrowing
Caesar, by Type of Regime): In a justice-nonmaterialistic society,
the gains from overthrowing Caesar are equal if Caesar is killed
and unequal if Caesar is enslaved.  In a status society, the gains12
from overthrowing Caesar are always unequal.  In a power-
nonmaterialistic society, the gains from overthrowing Caesar are
equal if Caesar is enslaved and unequal if Caesar is killed.
Result 2.2 (Equal and Unequal Gains from Overthrowing
Caesar, by Killing or Enslaving): If Caesar is killed, the gains
are equal in a justice-nonmaterialistic society and unequal in a
status society or a power-nonmaterialistic society.  If Caesar is
enslaved, the gains are equal in a power-nonmaterialistic society
and unequal in a justice-nonmaterialistic society or a status
society.
Result 2.3 (Unequal Gains from Overthrowing Caesar, by
Rank): In the four cases of unequal gains from overthrowing
Caesar, the gain is a decreasing function of rank in the justice-
nonmaterialistic/enslaving-Caesar case and an increasing function
of rank in a status society and in the power-nonmaterialistic/
killing-Caesar case.
If persons with greater gains are more likely to lead the mutiny or insurrection, then the
higher-ranking always lead the revolution in a status society and sometimes in a power-
nonmaterialistic society, but never in a justice-nonmaterialistic society.  In a justice-
nonmaterialistic society, the leaders of the rebellion will come from the bottom or randomly from
across all ranks.
3.3.  Does Group Size Affect the Gain from Killing or Enslaving Caesar?  
Inspection of the change formulas shows that group size has no effect on CJ in the
enslaving case, as it does not appear in the formula.  In the other five cases we take the first
partial derivatives of the change formulas with respect to N and find that the effect is negative in
all five.  These results are summarized in Panel C of Table 1.
Expressed formally:13
Result 3 (Equal and Unequal Gains from Overthrowing
Caesar, Holding Own Rank Constant): The gains from
overthrowing Caesar are equal in one of the six cases considered
and unequal in the other five.
Result 3.1 (Equal and Unequal Gains from Overthrowing
Caesar, by Type of Regime): In a justice-nonmaterialistic society,
the gains from overthrowing Caesar are impervious to group size
if Caesar is enslaved and vary with group size if Caesar is killed. 
In a status society or a power-nonmaterialistic society, the gains
from overthrowing Caesar always vary by group size.
Result 3.2 (Equal and Unequal Gains from Overthrowing
Caesar, by Killing or Enslaving): If Caesar is killed, group size
always affects the gains.  If Caesar is enslaved, group size affects
the gains in a status society or a power-nonmaterialistic society
but has no effect in a justice-nonmaterialistic society.
Result 3.3 (Unequal Gains from Overthrowing Caesar, by
Group Size): In the five cases where group size affects the gains,
the effect is negative, so that the larger the group, the smaller the
gain from overthrowing Caesar.
Thus, these results indicate that, with the exception of the justice-enslaving case (the case
where group size has no effect), the gains are larger in small societies, suggesting that toppling
Caesar is a phenomenon of relatively small groups.
3.4.  Is the Gain Larger from Killing or Enslaving Caesar?  
Solving the inequality within each force-regime, we find that the gains are always larger
under the enslaving option.  For example, in the justice-nonmaterialistic case, contrasting the
gain from killing Caesar – ln[(N+1)/N] – with that from enslaving Caesar – ln[(i+1)/i] – indicates
that the killing gain is always smaller than the enslaving gain.  Mathematically, this is due to the14
logarithmic operation, whereby 1/N is always smaller than 1/i; for example, in a group of size
100, 1/100 is a smaller quantity than ½ or 1/3 or 1/4, etc.  These results are collected in Panel D
of Table 1.
Expressed formally, we have the fourth result:
Result 4 (Greater Gain from Enslaving Caesar Than From
Killing Caesar): In the three types of societies considered –
justice-nonmaterialistic, status, and power-nonmaterialistic – the
gain from enslaving Caesar always exceeds the gain from killing
Caesar.
3.5.  If the Gain Is Always Greater under the Enslaving Option, Why Kill Caesar?  
These results suggest that a plausible answer involves the desire for equality, the desire,
that is, to achieve equal gains.  As we have seen, equal gains are only possible in a justice
society.  So we may speculate that killing Caesar only occurs in a justice society and that the
reason it occurs is to ensure that all group members reap equal gains.
4.  DISCUSSION
Shakespeare was right.  The ruler – or any top-ranked person – is vulnerable on many
fronts and especially vulnerable to removal.  Moreover, our results suggest that the people’s gain
from unseating the ruler is always positive.  Thus, Machiavelli’s prescription to gain the esteem
of the people as a buffer against conspirators requires measures from beyond the ordinary world
of sociobehavioral forces – measures to substantially offset the gain from unseating Caesar.
Our analysis indicates that although everyone gains, the gains are not necessarily equal
for all group members.  In one scenario – enslaving Caesar in a justice-nonmaterialistic regime –
the lower-ranked reap greater gains, while in three scenarios – killing Caesar in a power-
nonmaterialistic regime and always in a status regime – the opposite occurs, namely, the higher-
ranked reap greater gains.  There are two scenarios, however, in which all gains are equals –
enslaving Caesar in a power-nonmaterialistic regime and killing Caesar in a justice-15
nonmaterialistic regime.
Group size also matters, according to our results.  In five of the six scenarios, the gains
from overthrowing Caesar are greater in small groups than in large groups.  In the sixth scenario,
the gains do not vary by group size.  Thus, toppling Caesar would seem to be a phenomenon of
small groups – not only small societies but also small sets of conspirators.
Finally, we asked the question that has fired the universal imagination, Why kill Caesar? 
We established that in all three societies examined – justice-nonmaterialistic, status, and power-
nonmaterialistic – group members reap greater gains from enslaving than from killing Caesar. 
Thus, it would seem that no insightful conspirator, no rebel who has studied the historical record,
would kill Caesar.  Rather, Caesar would be imprisoned or exiled, like Napoleon, or even re-
educated, like the last emperor of China.
Alas, justice theory suggests a reason for killing rather than enslaving Caesar.  In a
justice-nonmaterialistic world, the gains from removing Caesar are equal if and only if Caesar is
killed.  In a power-nonmaterialistic world, remember, the gains from removing Caesar are equal
if and only if Caesar is enslaved.  Thus, there are in general two paths to achieve equal gains. 
But in a world already under the aegis of justice, only a single path to equal gains remains –
killing Caesar.  Thus we speculate that Caesar is killed only in a justice-nonmaterialistic regime
and with the otherwise noble purpose of achieving equality.
These are all theoretical predictions, of course, and subject to empirical test.  Moreover, it
is important to obtain parallel results for the two other kinds of societies, the materialistic justice
and power societies.  If it turns out that among all five basic types of societies, only the two
justice societies yield equal gains from killing Caesar, then these results provide the beginnings
of a fresh interpretation of the historical record.  In that long line of slain tyrants, the societies
valued justice, and equality was the killers’ motive.  If only the justice-nonmaterialistic society
yields equal gains from killing Caesar, then there is additional information about the dominance
of ordinal valued goods.  Further, it is important as well to obtain results for societies which
combine elements of the five ideal types, as such results would place further necessary and  Jasso (in press) suggests that persons can be characterized by the configuration of
6
quantitative characteristics, qualitative characteristics, and sociobehavioral forces in their
identities, and societies by the configuration of elements in their members’ identities.  The
individual’s configuration is termed personality, and the society’s configuration is termed
culture.  Jasso (in press) goes on to suggest that one of the ensuing empirical challenges is to
correctly describe real-world societies in terms of these configurations of personal quantitative
characteristics, personal qualitative characteristics, and sociobehavioral forces.  For further
discussion of the general empirical challenges that arise in testing the predictions of deductive
theories, see Jasso (2004, 2006b).
16
sufficient conditions on the links between tyrannicide and the three sociobehavioral forces.  
6
Thus, the work reported in this paper serves to highlight new directions of inquiry and to
underscore yet again the long reach of the three sociobehavioral forces and the possible primacy
of justice.
These results also lead to a further speculation.  If everyone gains from removing Caesar,
then perhaps no second-in-command or third-in-command will participate in removing Caesar,
for they would themselves immediately become vulnerable to removal.  The best defense against
removal may well be the knowledge that mortal threat comes with the top rank, and whoever
holds top rank is thereby vulnerable.17
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